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A landmark case of a constitutional court can be told by its impact on consecutive judgments and our
understanding of constitutional law and practice. Yet, in the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal
(further as CT or the Tribunal), there are a handful of cases considered as landmark decisions not because of
their outcome or the way they are decided, but because the Tribunal got them wrong. In this sense, the Polish
ritual animal slaughter case is a landmark decision.[1]
In this case, the CT had to decide whether the Act on animal protection, [2] which mandated that vertebrate
animals are killed after being stunned subject to criminal sanctions, violates constitutional freedom of religion of
members of a Jewish community. Although the constitutional review was initiated on an abstract motion of the
Union of Jewish religious communities, the Tribunal went far beyond the scope of this motion. The Tribunal, in a
9-to-5 decision, held that the law is unconstitutional, insofar as it did not allow ritual slaughter. The Tribunal did
not specify that the law should recognize rights of a particular religious community and its members who wish to
observe religious dietary rules. Instead the Tribunal found that ritual slaughter as a method of killing animals is
constitutional regardless of whether it is performed by a pious slaughterer as a form of a religious practice
intended to provide kosher (halal) meat for local consumption or by an employee of a slaughter house producing
tons of kosher (halal) meat for export, and for profit. Surprisingly, in this case, the Tribunal indirectly balanced
the public interest of animal protection against economic freedom, and decided in favour of the latter.
Such decision of the Polish Tribunal was not necessary because the claim of the Jewish religious community
was based solely on religious grounds, and did not allege an infringement of freedom of economic activity. Thus,
the Tribunal had to examine whether the lack of a religious exemption from generally binding law on animal
protection served a legitimate interest, and was suitable, necessary and proportionate in the strict sense. The
first hurdle in this analysis concerned the identification of a legitimate aim. Like the German Basic Law before the
2002 amendment, the Polish Constitution did not enumerate animal protection among worthy purposes in the
general limitation clause. Yet, the Tribunal accepted that non-stun slaughter could be legitimately justified by
reasons of public morality as the moral imperative requires that all humans treat other beings in a humane
manner. However, the elaboration of public morality as a premise in the limitation clause revealed a number of
pitfalls.
For the Tribunal, public morality shall not denote the morality of the majority, but a set of rules, norms, values,
views and models of conduct, which are generally acceptable in a democratic society. Thus, public morality may
justify only such limitations of constitutional rights and freedoms that would be considered as generally harmful,
rather than harmful in the perception of the majority. In addition to the individual discomfort of a particular group
in the society, a conduct prohibited for the reason of the protection of public morality needs to have a negative
impact on the society as such.
In this case, involving such politically and historically delicate issues like religious practices of Jews, it was
obvious that the Tribunal would try to avoid the impression of imposing the majority (Christian) view on a minority
recognized not only as a religious community, but also as a national minority. Currently, there are only 8000
Jews who officially live in Poland, while only some of them follow orthodox dietary prescriptions. It was also
expected that the Tribunal would emphasize the fundamental role of freedom of religion and include analogous
practices of Muslims (Ḏabīḥah). Yet, it was not expected that the Tribunal will indirectly grant religious exemption
to meat producers.
Crucially, this is the first case when the Polish Tribunal has struck down a limitation of a fundamental right that
was justified exclusively by reasons of public morality. In practice, public morality appears to be the weakest
justification, which is frequently encompassed by other grounds – public security, public order and rights of
others. Thus, it could be argued that in the constitutional practice in Poland, public morality does not have an
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autonomous strength, but serves to complement justification of limitations imposed on constitutional rights
primarily aimed at the protection of other public interests or conflicting rights. In this context, it is pertinent to ask
why the European Court of Human Rights relies on this premise more often.[3] One could expect that the
common denominator of public morality among members of the Council of Europe is lower than the standard
accepted at the domestic level in such country as Poland.
One reason why public morality is not a weighty argument in the constitutional review is related to the
constitutional interpretation of constitutional rights and freedoms, according to which there is an inherent
hierarchy of constitutional rights and freedoms. In result, not every public interest may suffice to justify certain
limitations of constitutional rights or freedoms, in particular when they belong to the most protected category such
as right to life, right to personal liberty, freedom of speech or freedom of religion. In result, the existence of the
hierarchy of constitutional rights and freedoms, coupled with the hierarchy of constitutionally protected public
interests, may render the proportionality analysis superfluous. Yet, it is not the case, because the Polish Tribunal
actually combines the categorical interpretation of constitutional rights and freedoms with the proportionality test,
adopting a different level of deference to limitations of different categories of constitutional rights (personal,
political, or economic, social, and cultural).
A total ban on ritual slaughter is blatantly excessive when it is viewed from the perspective of freedom of religion.
Yet, the outcome of balancing between freedom of economic activity, unsupported by religious considerations,
and public morality (animal protection) is less evident,[4] given that economic freedom does not belong to the
most protected category in the hierarchy of constitutional rights and freedoms. The Tribunal’s finding was even
more confusing because the majority and dissent did not agree on whether shechita is humane or not. Thus, the
lack of consensus between judges as to wrongfulness of killing animals without prior stunning shows that there
is no overwhelming consensus in this matter in the society as well. However, according to the majority opinion in
this case, the prohibition of shechita was not necessary to protect public morals. Holding this view, the majority
acted as if there was no legitimate ground justifying the total ban on ritual slaughter that was strong enough to
prevail over religious freedom.
Thus, one way to look at the Tribunal’s decision is to notice that it presumed that public morality cannot compete
with freedom to practice one’s religion without involving into proportionality analysis. Had the Tribunal decided on
Satanist or Santeria animal sacrifice, the conflict between the alleged freedom of religion and public morality
would be perhaps more sharp and meaningful. Interestingly, the arguments of animal defenders were not heard
when the legislator exempted hunting from the prohibition of non-stun killing of animals, while remaining silent on
religious slaughter. [5]
What the Tribunal could do in this case was to recognize that the legislator did not fulfil its positive obligation to
protect religious freedom, which is particularly important for minority communities. Yet, this exercise would then
require involving into the proportionality analysis of a legal gap. As it is eloquently noticed by Aharon Barak,
‘avoiding a positive constitutional duty – much like imposing a limitation on a negative right – does not
automatically render the omission unconstitutional’.[6] The examination of a legislative gap also requires the
proportionality test. In result of this test, the Tribunal should have constructed a ‘missing’ norm that is not only
responsive to the demands of Jews and Muslims living in Poland, but also to animal defenders. Therefore, the
missing religious exemption should comply with the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality in
the strict sense. Otherwise, reasons of public morality, or precisely the constitutionally protected animal welfare,
are not taken seriously.
Summing up, in the ritual slaughter case, the Constitutional Tribunal rightly found that the law, which totally
excludes the possibility of conducting an important religious practice of a minority religion is excessive, and thus
unnecessary for the protection of animal welfare. In this case, the legislative omission was not partial, but total,
thus in this scenario the judicial discretion should not necessarily be extremely narrow.[7] Yet, the Polish Tribunal
wrongly reconstructed the motion of the Union of Jewish Communities. While finding that the lack of an religious
exemption is unconstitutional, it filled out a normative lacuna with a new norm, which is disproportionate as it
grants an extensive protection to ritual practices unrelated to the aim of proving meat for local consumption of
members of a religious community. In consequence of this judgment, meat producers may carry out mass ritual
slaughter as long as the legislator does not decide to act and have the last word on this matter. At least, in this
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round.[8]
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